Therefore, it is crucial for southern Malians to strengthen their support for the process through the political elites and civil society organizations they are supposed to represent. They played no role in the discussions that led to the signing of the agreement in 2015, and many reject a text that was negotiated without their contribution. The 2015 text gave the Malian government the task of providing information and raising public awareness of the content of the agreement, but as the Carter Center noted, the government has done little in this regard. There are now more public campaigns protesting against the peace agreement than for him. Awareness-raising initiatives have focused on people in the north, ignoring the fact that the agreement also applies to southern Mali, particularly through regionalization reform and the creation of a senate. Although stakeholders failed to implement the 2015 agreement, they pushed ad hoc agreements beyond the limits of the agreement. In October 2015 and again in 2017, the CMA and the Platform conducted a bottom-up reconciliation separate from the agreement and signed ceasefire agreements that reduced violent incidents between the groups. In January, France and the members of the G5 Sahel – Mali, Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania – announced the formation of the ”Coalition for the Sahel”, which will focus on counter-terrorism and economic development issues in the region. And in February, after years of secret deals with elements of the JNIM, the Malian government officially announced that it was negotiating with the JNIM to negotiate a political solution to jihadist violence in northern and central Mali. The many peace negotiations and security operations outside the structure of the agreement are a tacit admission that the agreement simply does not work. Some doubt that the change of government in Algeria at the end of May, in which Foreign Minister Lamamra – the architect of the peace agreement – was replaced, could affect Algeria`s engagement in Mali, and also whether the structurally difficult structure of the monitoring committee should be maintained, as implementation extends beyond the transition period. The agreement is a product of its time, focused on insecurity and separatism in the north of the country, which was the hot spot of the negotiation process. He did not have the foresight to describe the impact on the security and development of Mali`s central regions, and he failed to adapt to the developing conflict.

In fact, the emphasis on reconciliation in the agreement only mentions the ”Azawad problem” and refers to a potential state declared by the Tuareg-led rebels themselves, encompassing the northern regions of Mali. The agreement and subsequent timetables remained silent on the inter-ethnic conflict in the central regions between nomadic Fulani (Fulani) herders and Dogon and Bambara farmers. Although these ethnic tensions have worsened since 2015, the agreement`s lack of strategies to ease existing ethnic tensions in the central regions has made the document flawed from the outset. Indeed, critics accuse the agreement`s sole emphasis on northern rebels of encouraging other minorities to use force to secure concessions. While hd initially focused its efforts on resolving intra-community conflicts in Mali, in 2014 the focus was on supporting national and international peace efforts. The parties say they support the agreement five years after it was signed in June 2015, but its implementation has proved extremely difficult. The Carter Center – which was appointed as an independent observer in Mali at the end of 2017 – reports virtually no progress on this front: in 2017, 22% of the provisions of the agreement had entered into force, three years later, they were 23%. None of the five pillars of the agreement has been satisfactorily implemented. In addition to the lack of will, the Malian state and the CMA are also trying to maintain the status quo: the CMA enjoys de facto considerable autonomy in its spheres of influence in northern Mali, while many of its members are employed in the bodies created by the agreements, such as the CSA and the interim authorities. At the same time, this state of affairs allows the Malian state to delay the implementation of the most sensitive provisions of the 2015 agreement, including those that involve constitutional reform.

In August 2017, public pressure – some of which was mobilized against the implementation of the agreement – forced the government to postpone a draft constitutional referendum. By maintaining the status quo, the government is preventing social unrest while maintaining its commitment to the international community to continue implementing the agreement. The Carter Center is an independent observer of the 2015 Malian peace agreement. Mali is marked by civil war and relies on United Nations peacekeepers to maintain order; The role of the Centre is to encourage all parties to comply with their obligations under the Agreement so that a lasting peace is possible. (Photo: Carter Center/J. Hahn) In addition to the threats to peace posed by terrorist groups and transnational and organized criminal networks, the conflicts in Mali are based on several internal problems. These internal problems include the CMA movements` claim to self-determination or autonomy, the socio-economic marginalization of the northern regions, pervasive corruption, impunity, conflicts between and within the community, and the lack of inclusive mechanisms in governance. While these internal problems have been recognized by all parties to the peace agreement, there is no link between specific issues and competing groups in a way that could lead to representation and accountability for the proposed corrective measures. Instead, the provisions of the peace agreement provide for a comprehensive reform of state institutions in order to improve their effectiveness in meeting the needs of citizens and the integration of members of different armed groups into various state institutions, including government and defense and security institutions (see in particular Article 1(c), Articles 6 and 31). This will have two important implications. First, the implementation of the agreement will force rebel groups and movements to dissolve. Secondly, once the leaders of the rebel movements are integrated into the institutions of the State, any monitoring of the fulfilment of the promises of the peace agreement must be carried out by the citizens themselves.

This lack of structure of actors to pursue the implementation of the agreed changes and to take them into account for the members of Malian society affected by the problem in question risks favouring the emergence of rebel movements. This led to discussions on the appointment of an independent observer by the Monitoring Committee to objectively assess the status of implementation of article 63 of the Peace Agreement. While it is difficult to imagine how such an observer could assign blame (or recommend sanctions, as some members of the Security Council seem to hope), his appointment could prove to be a useful mechanism to replace the follow-up committee on the street. However, the role of the observer will be limited to this – to observe. As a result, friendly but sustained pressure from countries in the region – all members of the international mediation team, but each with influence over the various parties, including the government – will be crucial to ensure that this peace agreement, unlike the previous ones, is finally implemented. Southern Malians` opposition to the agreement has prevented progress in implementing the agreement. Since 2017, the government has postponed the deadline for the referendum on constitutional reform, now scheduled for the end of 2020. .